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This paper aims to develop some questions addressed in a previ-
ous volume of Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy. There I questioned the 
“interiorist” terminology and the manner in which it poses problems, 
casting doubt on whether it is capable of conveying the general mean-
ing of Nishida’s philosophy, since it seems almost unable to show its 
practical dimension (Cestari 2009). Here I will concentrate my analy-
sis on the modern idea of absolute nothingness (絶対無) as compared 
to the original, classical Buddhist notion of śūnyatā (J. kū, C. kong 空) 
or “emptiness.” The importance of this relationship lies in its being the 
only theoretical feature that, according to Maraldo, typifies the philoso-
phers of the Kyoto school.1 In this paper, I will mainly consider the case 
1. Maraldo 2001 lists several criteria to define the Kyoto school’s identity, but it 
is significant that absolute nothingness is the only genuinely theoretical one. In fact, 
the other criteria are historical and biographical (the relationship with Nishida and 
Tanabe or the academic position at the University of Kyoto), political (conservative 
political positions, and notably the rejection of Marxism and a certain attitude toward 
the Japanese nation and the Pacific War), or cultural and religious (a positive attitude 
toward Asian culture—particularly the Japanese tradition—and the relationship with 
religion in general and Buddhism in particular).
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of Nishida and his ambiguity toward Buddhism. Unlike Nishida, other 
thinkers of the school like Nishitani Keiji, especially after the end of the 
Pacific War, seem to return to a more classical, if philosophically revised, 
idea of kū. It is my conviction that the relationship with Buddhism is 
not simply a biographical datum but may be seen to have exerted a deep 
influence on Nishida’s theoretical views. Attention to this notion leads 
into a discussion of the Kyoto school texts and how they are interpreted. 
Obscurities require that interpreters and critics be aware of the cultural 
context within which these writings were composed and read. Only then 
is it possible to grasp what is most essential, which is often something 
that is not directly expressed (see Kasulis 2010).
A proper understanding of tacit assumptions is particularly impor-
tant in the case of Nishida. To evaluate his thinking critically on a world 
forum, finding the right words and metaphors to translate his ideas is 
necessary but not sufficient. Even that is difficult to accomplish without 
clarifying a general hermeneutic perspective. Only in this way can Nishi-
da’s essays become more intelligible both in terms of what is said and of 
what is left unsaid.
Buddhism may be of service here in bridging the cultural and histori-
cal gap that divides Japanese philosophers from non-Japanese readers 
and even Japanese readers who are not conscious of their cultural back-
ground. It can spell the difference between a de-contextualized interpre-
tation and one that is more self-conscious of the frame of reference from 
which an author is operating. In reading Nishida’s essays, however, one 
is struck by the relative absence, or at least scarcity, of direct citations 
of Buddhist texts or direct references to Buddhist ideas. May we still 
conclude that Nishida is influenced by Buddhism even though there is 
almost no evidence of the fact? Strange as it may seem, that it precisely 
what we must say. At the same time, I am persuaded that this is not a 
question that can be addressed, let alone resolved, by appealing to strict 
philological analysis alone. The particular nature of religious and philo-
sophical texts in China and Japan demands more. Cultural interpretation 
also has an important part to play. Accordingly, I will consider the place 
of the Buddhist notion of śūnyatā more as a hermeneutic pattern than as 
a historically and philologically attested relationship.
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Cultural and historical considerations
How are we to consider the meaning of absolute nothingness in 
Nishida’s thought? The question is complicated by a certain ambiguity 
in the notion itself. If, as I am insisting, Buddhism is a decisive element 
in establishing the originality of the Kyoto school, the foundational idea 
of absolute nothingness needs a Buddhist reading. Even so, there are 
at least three strains of ambiguity in the notion of absolute nothingness 
that complicate the task. The first concerns the way cultural and histori-
cal aspects overlap with and theoretical and religious ones. The second 
has to do mainly with the genealogy of the notion, which is a hybrid of 
German idealism and Buddhism. A third ambiguity stems from having 
to define “Japanese philosophy” in such a way as to confront western 
universalizing tendencies (often inadvertently ambiguous in themselves) 
with what amounted to a peculiar blend of East and West. In the end, 
there is no skirting the ambiguities, even though they may not be easy 
to identify. Still, insight into Buddhist teachings is essential for orienting 
our overall interpretation of Nishida’s philosophy.
The modern origins of absolute nothingness give the idea a cultural 
aura that belongs to Japan’s modernization in the Meiji and Taishō. At 
that time numerous philosophers tried to find a “logic” (論理) to reflect 
Japanese particularity in a philosophical context. The program of for-
malizing the Japanese soul or ethos or Weltanschauung in philosophi-
cal language was considered essential, given the strong cultural pressures 
exerted by western knowledge and Japan’s lack of an equivalent to aca-
demic philosophy. Absolute nothingness may also be considered one way 
of filling this lacuna. The need to clarify a Japanese logos was one Nishida 
himself shared, as typified in the introduction to From Acting to Seeing.2
To speak of the modern origins of absolute nothingness implies that 
it needs to be understood in a cultural context where it represents a 
response to the disenchantment and disorientation that followed the loss 
2. “At the root of Oriental culture, which nurtured our ancestors for thou-
sands of years, is there not something hiding that sees the form of the formless 
and hears the sound of the soundless? Our mind unceasingly searches for this 
thing and I wish to give a philosophical foundation to this demand” (nkz 4: 6).
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of premodern reference points. Indeed, it was this challenge of moder-
nity, not Buddhism, that motivated the thinkers of the Kyoto school to 
practice tetsugaku or western-styled academic philosophy. This is not to 
say that they passively accepted from the West its universalistic discourse. 
Their attempt was to raise the particular thinking of Japan to the level of 
universal philosophical learning, or alternatively, to rethink the universal 
in terms of the particularity of Japan. In effect, they brought into ques-
tion the inherent parochialism in western “universal” ideas, and they did 
so by alternatively adopting, criticizing, complementing, and otherwise 
thinking beyond the hegemony of received categories of thought. I find 
it difficult to agree with the recent critique of Sakai Naoki, who seems to 
indicate a universalistic dimension in their philosophical venture:
The discipline to which the Kyoto school was committed was “west-
ern philosophy”…. It was neither “Japanese,” “Asian,” nor “Buddhist” 
philosophy, even though its medium was the language of the Japanese 
nation; it was unambiguously the universal philosophy, the universal-
ity of which could not be modified by any national, regional, civiliza-
tional, or religious particularity. (Sakai 2008, 187–8)
I would rather say that the Kyoto school was experimenting with both 
western-style philosophy and Japanese thinking, and that their aim was 
to bring East and West closer together, despite the obscurities that this 
unaccustomed blend might give rise to (see nkz 12: 385–94).
Examining the historical and cultural background of the Kyoto school, 
as representatives of the Japanese intelligentsia, alerts us to the ways in 
which an idea like absolute nothingness could function as an ideological 
tool to help create a religiously and philosophically homogeneous and 
concentrated “East” to set against the “West” and its culture of being. 
As a category of thought it condensed cultural, religious and philosophi-
cal elements into an identity that the East could brandish as its own. 
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi’s “Oriental Nothingness” (1970) is a case in point, 
and it must be said that at times Nishida himself, albeit from a more 
nuanced position, teetered on the edge of such a position in distinguish-
ing the western tendency to self-affirmation from an eastern tendency 
to self-negation (see, for example, nkz 11: 174). By the same token, 
absolute nothingness was also a hermeneutical tool for reading western 
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cultural history. In this sense, nothingness became a matter of cultural 
identity, a kind of Buddhist shortcut to modern nationalistic thought. 
While Buddhism was being presented as the essence of Japanese or Asian 
civilization, absolute nothingness, employed as a hermeneutic device to 
interpret Buddhist history, often came to be considered the epitome of 
Buddhist, particularly Zen, teaching. In this way, it affected the way in 
which the cultural and religious history of Asia was approached as a whole.
A simple reconstruction of history based on a dualism between west-
ern being and eastern nothingness not only rides roughshod over the 
evidence; it also sidesteps the complex genesis of the idea of nothing-
ness with its fusion of Buddhist and idealist elements. As is well known, 
Hegel and Kant were instrumental in the formation of categories and 
themes that make up the philosophies of Nishida and Tanabe. Moreover, 
the Kyoto school thinkers shared with many other prewar philosophers 
an interest in building a new logic. In general this took the shape of a 
dialectics, often patterned after German idealism. So common was this in 
Taishō and early Shōwa philosophies that it was often criticized as a mere 
posturing or submission to the fashion of the day.3 
In any case, it seems reasonable to conclude that the term “absolute 
nothingness” relies heavily on these western sources, all the more so 
because of the prevalence in Kyoto school philosophy of other idealist—
notably Hegelian—notions such as determination, negation, and alien-
ation. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to reduce the notion to its 
idealist, Romanticist, or Hegelian roots. It came to birth rather on a 
middle ground where western philosophy and eastern culture encoun-
tered each other for the first time. I am convinced that Buddhism had an 
important role to play in the process.
Comparing philosophy and buddhism
Before entering into a comparison between śūnyatā and abso-
lute nothingness, it may be helpful to point to certain differences between 
3. Piovesana 1963, 250. Among these critics are Yoshimitsu Yoshihiko, Ōnishi 
Hajime, Takahashi Satomi (tsz 3: 264) and Tanabe Hajime (thz 3: 77).
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Buddhism and western philosophy. Not a few Buddhist terms resist 
direct translation into philosophical concepts. For one thing, modern 
western philosophy has kept its distance from religion, beginning with 
the ancient Greek distinction between λόγος and μύθος, and was fortified 
by the Christian emphasis on a faith competing with rational understand-
ing. Unlike Buddhist śraddha, faith makes truth claims that set it up for 
a confrontation with reason and thinking which, in its extreme, reduces 
philosophy to an ancilla fidei. Buddhist “faith” is not generally centered 
on truth content but to the exercise of a decision to follow the dharma, 
which is more a problem of will than of truth. The grounds for a credo 
quia absurdum that severs faith from reason are lacking. In Buddhism, 
reason is not a merely mundane, secularized, and demythologized dis-
position of intellect; neither does faith make any claim to replace reason. 
Since a distinction between myth and logos, reason and faith is absent, 
Buddhism cannot be described as “pure religion” opposed to “pure phi-
losophy.” Buddhist discourse joins philosophical elements seamlessly 
with religious and practical ones.
Doctrines have a certain importance in Buddhism, but are far less 
important than they are in modern philosophy, which is completely 
devoted to elaborating abstract notions. Compared with Buddhism, in 
modern philosophy human experience is limited to conceptual discourse. 
In Buddhism reference to practice, rituals, performance is essential—
dimensions that are all but absent in modern thinking. A philosophical 
text in the Buddhist context is not simply an object of intellectual aca-
demic study. It is also, and more essentially, an object of practice, ritual, 
and even worship.4 This practical importance of the text is essential for 
understanding the rhetorical use of negation in Chan and Zen, which is 
obviously far from Nishida’s merely conceptual negation (Heine 1997).
In Buddhism, the pedagogical moment is crucial for the very concep-
tual and theoretical dimension. Treatment of the “twofold truth”—the 
distinction between conventional (saṃvṛtti satya) and ultimate truths 
(paramārtha satya) in Nāgārjuna, for example—and the related doc-
4. For example, the Heart Sūtra, whose philosophical complexity is well known, 
was often worshipped and even considered as a powerful talisman against demons. 
See Lopez 1996.
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trine of “skillful means” (upāyakauśālya, 方便) are clear examples of this 
orientation and show how seriously the importance of the hermeneutic 
process of awareness is considered. The difference in aim is notable. In 
the one, the goal is religious, which means that it carries in itself a cer-
tain dialectics between salvation and wisdom (salvational wisdom, wis-
dom as salvation); in the other, the goal is knowledge directed toward an 
“external” object. The religious goal entails bodily engagement that is 
not required of modern philosophers. In this regard, despite many simi-
larities between the philosophical world of the Kyoto school and modern 
philosophy, the pivotal role that practice plays for these thinkers can-
not be overlooked. On balance, their approach is more intellectual than 
practical, and like tetsugaku (modern academic philosophy) in general, 
the praxis of thought is not directly related to any religious or practical 
way. And yet some important first steps in that direction have been taken 
by Nishida and Tanabe, and even more by postwar thinkers like Nishi-
tani, Hisamatsu, and Ueda.
Problems in defining śūnyatā
In comparing the absolute nothingness of the Kyoto school 
with Buddhist emptiness, a number of critical problems concerning the 
idea of emptiness in Buddhist history come to the fore. I shall summa-
rize some of the most important ones.
Emptiness is a complex idea not only because of its technicalities 
and subtleties, but also because it has been interpreted in many differ-
ent ways throughout the long history of Buddhism. Nearly every Bud-
dhist sect or school developed its own interpretation of emptiness, from 
the early Buddhist idea of anatta (impermanence of both knower and 
known), to the sophisticated notion of śūnyatā śūnyatā (impermanence 
of the very Buddhist doctrine, or Dharma, and Buddha himself) in the 
Prajñāpāramitā tradition and Nāgārjuna with his idea of twofold truth; 
from Yogācāra’s theory of three natures (trisvabhāva), to the idea of a 
“buddha-womb” (tathāgatagarbha, 如来蔵). Chinese Buddhism added 
its own interpretations, as in Zhiyi’s threefold truth (void 空, conven-
tional 假, and middle 中) and the Huayan dialectics of principle 理 and 
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phenomenon 事 to replace the idea of kong 空 (Kumarajīva’s translation 
of the Sanskrit word śūnyatā). Neither can we neglect to mention the 
Chan/Zen debate on “mind” (心) and “buddha-nature” (佛性), which 
is also to be found in Dōgen. Surveying the length and breadth of this 
field, it seems unlikely that any formulation of the idea of emptiness can 
be singled out as the most representative, despite Hakamaya Noriaki’s 
attempt to do just that in making the thinking of Tsongkhapa (1357–
1419) paradigmatic (1990, 58).
Another difficulty is the relative weight attached to emptiness in Bud-
dhism. It is often said that Indian Buddhism differed from other religious 
movements of its times because it was anātmavāda, or śūnyavāda. In fact, 
East-Asian Buddhism generally takes a rather positive attitude towards 
the world and is much more attracted to the idea of tathāgatagarbha. 
The emphasis put on mind is derived from this idea and is central in 
lineages such as Chan Buddhism (Heine 2004). As is known, “criti-
cal Buddhism” has raised some fundamental questions regarding this 
notion, but they seem to have stirred up more dust than light (see Hub-
bard and Swanson, 1997). 
Important scholars of Buddhism like Umehara and Yanagida (1969, 
193ff) have argued that the concept of nothingness(無, J. mu, C. wu) has 
been overemphasized in Zen, as typified in the famous kōan of Jōshu’s 
dog and its buddha-nature. To a certain extent, Yanagida and Umehara 
ascribe this interpretation to the influence of the Kyoto school. If this 
is the case, it would invite us to rethink some of the assumptions con-
cerning the importance of nothingness and emptiness in Buddhist his-
tory. Just how representative is this idea in the Buddhism of China and 
Japan? Does such a difficult doctrine really have authoritative power in 
Buddhism or was it merely part of an esoteric tradition? In judging this 
notion as fundamental, might we not be relying too heavily on the west-
ern assumption that theoretical aspects predominate over practical ones?
An important distinction should also be drawn between Vedic, Daoist, 
and Buddhist ideas of nothingness or emptiness. In Vedic culture, the 
role of negation with regard to ultimate reality is used to underline the 
unutterable dimension of a permanent essence of the world (Brahman). 
For some Daoist scholars, such as Wangbi from the “Study of Mystery” 
school (Xuan Xue 玄學), wu is definitely a metaphysical foundation, the 
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hidden origin of everything, beyond every possible word and conceptu-
alization. It is the totally indeterminate. In Indian Buddhism, śūnyatā 
is a way of looking at the world, a non-attached attitude to life (which 
means non-attachment to both annihilationism and eternalism). The 
ideas of nothingness as a mental attitude (Buddhism) and nothingness 
as a metaphysical principle (Daoism) should therefore be kept separate, 
at least on an abstract level, even though historically matters are not so 
simple, given the way Daoist and Buddhist ideas have intermingled in 
the intellectual history of China and Japan.
In China, the adoption of wu as a translation of śūnyatā created numer-
ous misunderstandings and obscurities before Kumarajīva’s work. In fact, 
śūnyatā had nothing to do with the Daoist opposition between the cor-
relatives of being (有) and nonbeing (無). The Buddhist point of view 
took the opposition as between the relative and the nonsubstantial, but 
it could also be interpreted as an opposition between substantial being 
and negative nothingness. This ambiguity caused Kumarajīva to translate 
śūnyatā with kong (空), while Zhiyi for his part elaborated the threefold 
conception of truth—empty, conventional, and middle—to avoid just 
such misunderstanding (Swanson 1989, 14).
Similar problems would later arise in the West with the rendering of 
śūnyatā as “nothingness.” As is known, the metaphysical opposition 
between being and nothingness is as old as philosophy itself. To avoid 
this confusion, “emptiness” is a clearer (and etymologically more accu-
rate) rendition. Hence, from the Buddhist point of view, Nishida and 
Tanabe’s use of the idea of nothingness could be accused of inaccuracy 
and of misleading readers of their thought.5 What is more from the per-
spective of contemporary philosophy, the strong idealist language used 
by the Kyoto school philosophers before the end of the Pacific War has 
been more of a hindrance than a help in evaluating their contributions 
to world philosophy. Their choice of terms can certainly be explained 
historically (for example, as an indication of the influence of Hegel or the 
5. Swanson (1996) has expressed similar ideas about the use of the term “nothing-
ness” in Nishitani, although he correctly points out that the adjective “absolute” may 
help differentiate it from nonbeing.
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need to oppose western culture on its home ground), but it cannot be 
considered theoretically appropriate.
Another issue is the relationship between Buddhism and modernity. 
As is known, Buddhism in modern times was often interpreted in new 
ways by the so-called Buddhist modernists. Nishida and the Kyoto phi-
losophers were close to Suzuki Daisetsu, one of the most renowned 
and influential of Japanese Buddhist modernists. Considering the deep 
influence of Suzuki on Nishida, we cannot ignore the role of modernist 
Buddhism on the Kyoto school’s interpretation of śūnyatā in terms of 
absolute nothingness.
Buddhism as a hermeneutic pattern
I do not think it possible to establish a direct and textually 
unequivocal relationship between Buddhism and Nishida’s philosophy. 
A rough comparison of the number of occurrences and quotations from 
Buddhist texts with those from western philosophers in his Complete 
Works shows a striking imbalance. Western philosophers are cited far 
more numerously and accurately, while citations of Buddhist texts and 
authors are rare and rather general. Nishida’s use of Buddhist sūtras is 
anything but precise. As Kopf (2005) has pointed out, Nishida never 
seriously discussed any Buddhist idea. How then can we be sure that he 
is really referring to Buddhist concepts at all? According to Girard, the 
extreme variety of interpretations of emptiness in the history of Bud-
dhism, together with the never explicit textual reference to Buddhist 
writings, makes any attempt to draw connection to Nishida’s idea risky, if 
not entirely arbitrary (Girard 2008, 48–9). This is certainly true from a 
textual point of view. If any fruitful comparison is to be made, it must be 
philologically aware, yet this is precisely what we seem unable to do with 
the texts Nishida left us.
Meantime, Dalissier (2009) has shown precise connections between 
Nishida’s philosophy and classical Chinese thought. Still, it is going a bit 
too far to conclude that there was a strong influence. Nishida may have 
studied Chinese literature, but this does not necessarily mean that his 
ideas may be directly correlated to counterparts in Chinese philosophies. 
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All we can show is that he was a man of his times, with a refined educa-
tion that included a knowledge of Chinese classics. Can the same be said 
of his knowledge of Buddhism? Was it anything more for Tanabe and 
Nishida than one part of the general cultural heritage they were exposed 
to? I think not, although there is no strictly textual evidence to sup-
port this position. Non-textual elements need not be ruled out, how-
ever. For example, we know from Nishida’s diaries that at the time of 
his first work, A Study of the Good (1911), he practiced Zen meditation 
assiduously. Does this qualify his ideas as Buddhist? Of course not, but 
it does say something about the tacit—though not hidden—presence of 
Buddhist ideas in his writing. 
To examine this assumption, we need to shift our approach from phi-
lology to hermeneutics. We have to understand how a text is created, 
and in particular how it interacts with its surrounding world, especially 
where the cultural context is far removed from our own. A text is not 
only to be read but interpreted, which means that it must interact within 
the interpreter’s horizon of meanings, images, and words. Where a text 
is obscure—which is not uncommon in Nishida’s philosophical essays—
some insight into the cultural environment and the personal life of the 
scholar may be essential for its comprehension. Such an appeal to herme-
neutic form may not be as persuasive as direct textual evidence, but it 
cannot be discarded as altogether insignificant.
Nishida’s approach to Buddhist texts is quite different from that of Bud-
dhist specialists like Nanjō Bun’yū (1849–1927), who went to Europe, 
to study Sanskrit and Indian philosophy with F. Max Mueller and soon 
became one of the most important and renowned Buddhist scholars of 
his day. In premodern Japan, religious texts were generally read more as 
a form of practice than as a guide to rational understanding. It was more 
important that a text be recited and memorized than that it be intel-
lectually understood and critically discussed. We may assume Nishida 
was used to thinking of Buddhism from the standpoint of a practitioner 
rather than as a scholar.
This gives us cause to reflect on the importance of the linguistic and 
cultural context in the textual tradition of the Kyoto school. What kind 
of texts are we facing when we read an essay by Nishida? Does it follow 
western academic conventions? I find him swinging between academic 
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philosophical essays and the Japanese textual tradition. This does not 
mean that his thinking is untranslatable, only that the cultural context 
is crucial to reading him correctly. Taking into account his non-western 
origins also means considering the importance of indirect citation in the 
Japanese literary tradition, which is reflected in the paucity of annotation 
in academic publications. Not all of Nishida’s faults as a writer are his 
own; he was very much influenced by the conventions of composition in 
sway at the time. 
As Jullien (1995) and Kasulis (2010) have indicated, the preference 
for evocation, intimation, allusion, and silence over clarity of expres-
sion is not simply a matter of “style.” It indicates an essentially differ-
ent approach to theoretical problems, a different way of considering the 
aims of philosophy. One may argue that Nishida’s philological failures 
regarding Buddhist sources have much to do with an approach to the 
role of texts shared with his cultural surroundings. Since he wrote in 
Japanese, he will have assumed that, however unorthodox his manner of 
expression, his readers would share a common base of knowledge that 
would make his work accessible. Such a conclusion seems preferable to 
direct accusations of a schizophrenia between his practice of Zen and his 
philosophical theory, or between his approach to a few, dimly perceived 
eastern sources and to a large number of carefully parsed western texts.
If this hypothesis is correct, we may say that whenever Nishida deals 
with a Buddhist idea, he proceeds by way of allusion and silence rather 
than by citation and explicit statement. He seems to rely on an unspoken, 
practical cultural heritage that envelops him and his readers. Attention to 
the unsaid as of more importance than the said may also illuminate for us 
the way in which he deepened his relationship with Buddhism. A Bud-
dhist orientation could then provide a beneficial model for interpretation. 
This is not to say that Buddhism could provide a comprehensive horizon 
against which to read Nishida’s philosophy. Nor do I mean to transform 
Nishida into a pious Buddhist believer. Instead, Buddhism could serve 
us as a kind of compass in order to navigate our way through some of 
his most difficult passages and help us grasp the general direction of his 
technical terms, his ambiguities, and his silence. A background refer-
ence to Buddhist themes could provide a hermeneutic key to encourage 
certain interpretations of Nishida and discourage certain others. This in 
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turn would give entry to some of the critical preconceptions behind the 
unfolding of Kyoto school philosophies. Far from encouraging an arbi-
trary reading of the texts, these hermeneutical considerations are meant 
to draw some provisional parameters within which to decide from a vari-
ety of possible interpretations.
This idea of using Buddhism as a hermeneutic pattern for the inter-
pretation of Nishida’s philosophy is not without its limitations. For 
one thing, it is hypothetical, since it is not supported by direct textual 
evidence. For another, its utility in illuminating our reading of the 
Kyoto school risks producing wildly unsupported conclusions. What is 
more, using modern philosophical ideas to clarify historical Buddhist 
thinking runs the danger of anachronism, exoticism, and colonialism, 
and on those grounds alone should be avoided. For these reasons, we 
must remain alert to the possibility of oversimplifying the connections 
between Kyoto-school and Buddhist ideas. As long as these restrictions 
are kept in mind, however, Buddhist hermeneutical patterns can provide 
a valid aid for translations and critical commentary, especially in the case 
of Nishida, where an enhanced understanding of Buddhist śūnyatā can 
help highlight important allusions, suggestions, echoes, indications, and 
traces scattered between the lines of his writings.
The non-conceptual nature of emptiness
Can we still speak of absolute nothingness as a Buddhist notion? 
Is there still anything Buddhist about Nishida’s ideas? This discussion 
implies that there is something like a generally definable meaning for 
Buddhist śūnyatā, or at least a descriptive indication of its range of 
meanings. In fact, I do not think it possible to decide on one particular 
definition of emptiness, given by one master, which could be considered 
valid for the entire history of Buddhism. On the contrary, a more indi-
rectly suggestive kind of semantic orientation would probably be better 
suited to the way the Buddhist tradition treats its own concepts.
The word śūnya means “void,” “open,” “without,” “nothing,” “non-
existent.” The term śūnyatā therefore connotes emptiness, openness, 
nonexistence, or relativity. The word does not have a clear or system-
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atic meaning, but is more akin to a remedy for spiritual ailments that 
is adjusted according to the needs of the one who is ill. Unlike mod-
ern western philosophical notions, it presupposes practice, which entails 
concrete ethical behavior, wisdom, and meditation exercises (the three 
moments of śila, samadhi, and prajñā in the Buddhist path of salvation). 
Śūnyatā does not only point to the transiency and interrelatedness of 
things, to the fact that things are void of intrinsic essence and that their 
true being is radically relative (which may also be something wonderful 
and unexpected, as in the case of tathatā). It is also and at the same time 
a practical attitude towards the world, our lives, ourselves. In its purest 
form, it supersedes conceptualization, despite the numerous definitions 
of what it is and what it is not. It is fundamentally an attitude of mind, a 
way of looking at reality (cf. Streng 1987). 
Buddhist emptiness is often linked to the early Buddhist conception of 
anatta, or the middle path of Nāgārjuna, but it is not only that. As we 
have said, its philosophical content includes both a way of understanding 
our relationship with the world as well as a way of understanding how to 
reach the truth of received doctrines. In both cases it implies non-attach-
ment and freedom from the cravings and illusions that lead to dualistic 
polarizations. As far as philosophical doctrines are concerned, emptiness 
shuns the extremes of eternalism and of annihilationism. As a practical 
attitude, it can never be reduced to a conceptual tool for dominating 
reality or exercising control over the world. On the contrary, it is aimed 
at modifying the practitioner’s mind. This is the reason for insisting that 
conceptual emptiness needs itself to be emptied if it is to see and inhabit 
reality. Mere thought content leads to a conceptual position that in turn 
implies attachment, cognitively self-centered and dualistic abstraction—
that is, to the fundamental craving of reason. Emptiness resists definition 
precisely in order to resist such a position.
Nishida’s logic of place
Before taking up the idea of absolute nothingness in the philos-
ophy of Nishida, something needs to be said of the final theoretical con-
text within which he used the term, namely, the logic of place or basho 
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(場所の論理). A great deal of commentary has already been written on 
this matter,6 but here I would like to suggest that it may be read as a 
speculative discourse on the mind.7 I mean this not in the sense of an 
epistemological or formal analysis of the rules that control correct reason-
ing but rather as an ontological inquiry into interiority and the mind. 
Nishida’s aim in the middle period of his development was to find 
a logical and ontological way of dealing with the problem of the true 
self. He had already explored the notion in previous works but had 
been disappointed with the results. The logic of place, which sought to 
address the problem more radically, began with a discussion of judgment 
and subsumption, or the deepest structures of our thinking. Absolute 
nothingness provided the high point of the inquiry, a universal or all 
universals—and in that sense, a non-universal—that lay beyond both 
dichotomous thinking and the transcendental apperception of Kant’s Ich 
denke. Nishida’s focus on the problem of the mind should not be taken 
to imply that, like Hegel, he took thinking or the rational subject as the 
meaning of reality. On the contrary, the logic of place was aimed at find-
ing traces of reality within the very act of thinking. Thus even if the 
structure of place seems to converge with Kant’s critique, the orientation 
is completely opposite. 
As a logic of mind, the logic of place sought to overcome subjectivism, 
 arriving finally at a kind of intuitionism that encounters “things as they 
are,” as if reflected in an empty mirror without any possibility of distor-
tion by thought or will. This is the realm of what he called “the intel-
ligible world” (叡知的世界). In addition, this “logic of mind” gradually 
turned to the “logic of things” in Nishida’s final writings, suggesting a 
movement from interiority to a more comprehensive basho in which this 
6. For example Shikaya (1984) considers it as an idealist philosophy. Nakamura 
(1993, 69–81) interprets it in strongly psychologistic sense. I cannot agree with either 
of them. Contrary to Shikaya’s views, Nishida’s position is never simply idealist but 
deliberately sets out to overcome idealism. As for Nakamura’s criticisms, it need only 
be pointed out that Nishida’s logic was designed precisely to avoid the psychologistic 
and mystical tendencies he ventured near in early works.
7. This reading develops in a slightly different sense the insights of critics such as 
Miki Kiyoshi, who saw Nishida’s philosophy as more a “technology of mind” (心の技
術) than a “technology of things” (物の技術), with the result that he accused the logic 
of place as leaning toward contemplation or psychologism (mkz 18: 525).
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interiority and mind are enveloped and grounded. This final basho is the 
result of a transition from the place of absolute nothingness to the dia-
lectical world (弁証法的世界). Consequently, the logic of place becomes a 
logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity (絶対矛盾的自己同一). Nishi-
da’s talk of the dialectical world speaks from the perspective of the world 
itself, the bottomless ground of thinking and mind.8 The structure of 
the dialectical world, as described in the logic of absolutely contradictory 
self-identity, is not only a description of the realm of thinking, but also 
of the world in which thinking is located and of which thinking is a mani-
festation, that is the realm of the self-determination of the world itself. 
Notwithstanding the differences between absolute nothingness and 
absolutely contradictory self-identity, the latter derives from the first and 
both point to the same reality: the foundations of human existence con-
ceived in terms of its structural relationship with the world and expressed 
by means of logical constructs.
If the foregoing interpretation is correct and if the logic of place has 
mind as its main theme, this would mean that our ordinary, everyday 
world is not being approached by way of realism, as if there were “an 
outer reality” separated from “an inner consciousness.” Instead, it is an 
ontological explanation of mind in which our customary acceptance 
of the outside world is seen as a mental fabrication. This is one way of 
understanding the subsumption of being within the basho of relative 
nothingness. The idealism is only apparent, or perhaps more accurately, 
limited to the epistemic conditions of dualistic thinking. In fact, it is in 
the depths of the mind that Nishida seeks the traces of things as they 
truly are. During his final period, he speaks of this as the dimension at 
which the historical, dialectical world, including self-awareness, takes 
place.9 The “being” enveloped in the basho of being does not correspond 
to the world in the sense of realism, but it is what is subsumed by the “I 
think.” “Things as they are” (有りが儘) prior to our thinking about them 
8. We may therefore speak of a “noetic” period in Nishida’s thought that gradually 
gave way to a “noematic” phase, or, following Kosaka Kunitsugu’s definition, a move-
ment from an ōsō 往相 (“going to the absolute”) to a gensō 元相 (“returning from the 
absolute”) period (1997, 103).
9. For a detailed analysis of the philosopher’s path from the first works to the 
logic of place, see Ueda 1991.
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are manifest in the basho of absolute nothingness, which determines itself 
through self-negation, thereby giving rise to subject and object. 
This philosophical orientation overlaps with traditional metaphysical 
themes and categories. Indeed, Tanabe’s criticism of Nishida’s logic and 
his attempt to clear up the ambiguities of the logic of place was probably 
due precisely to this overlap. Nishida’s own gradual move away from a 
logic of place to a philosophy of the dialectical world may also be seen as 
an attempt to overcome the metaphysical limitations of his logic.
We may also observe that this general orientation is closer to Yogācāra 
teachings than it is to Kantian idealism. As Trivedi (2005) has argued, a 
major difference between the two lies in Vasubandhu’s view of the delu-
sional nature of the everyday world and consciousness. Nonetheless, he 
considers it possible to know the world as it is through the practice of 
meditation and Yoga. Kant was steadfast in asserting that philosophy 
can only proceed by way of practical reason, but this claim is limited to 
the level of theory. Moreover, he excludes any possibility of knowing the 
world as it is in itself. Vasubandhu, in contrast, leaves the path to reality 
open as a result of practice. Nishida’s position is similar insofar as it does 
not stop at the distinction between knowable phenomena and unknow-
able noumena, but goes further to claim that at its deepest level the mind 
is already in touch with the true form of things and that this true form of 
things is manifest in absolute nothingness. That said, his basho logic did 
not find a place for practice.
Nishida’s absolute nothingness
For the philosophers of the Kyoto school absolute nothingness 
is far from a univocal concept. Maraldo (2001) even goes so far as 
to suggest that it functions like a “floating signifier,” which would help 
account for the occasionally bitter confrontation between Nishida and 
Tanabe regarding the notion. In fact, this polysemic quality may even be 
essential to talk of absolute nothingness, just as we have seen it to be in 
the case of the Buddhist notion of emptiness.
May we then speak of “characteristics” of Nishida’s absolute nothing-
ness? Is it not better to leave it ineffable? This is hardly a solution, since 
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reducing it to the opposite of language still uses language as a measure. 
What is more, such a reduction would forfeit the positive significance of 
the ambiguity, which is rooted in the nature of the world itself: speak-
able but not completely so, unspeakable but not completely so. The 
ambiguity is a function of the permanently transitional character of the 
world and the impossibility of ever defining it fully. The world is not only 
ambivalent, it is manifold, perhaps even infinite, in its possibilities. In this 
sense, absolute nothingness points to the never-completely-objectifiable 
quality of both world and mind, their ineluctable otherness to thinking.
In listing the basic traits of Nishida’s absolute nothingness, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that certain, though not all, of the traits are also 
predicable to other basho (such as the basho of being and of relative noth-
ingness), overlap with them, and entail them. We may thus outline the 
traits of absolute nothingness as follows:
 Borderline. Absolute nothingness has a borderline character. Nishida 
refers to it as the outer limit (Grenze) of self-awareness, the final uni-
versal, and so forth. In this sense, it is the point at which conscious 
thinking ceases, allowing things to appear in their true reality. Noth-
ingness is neither an object of thinking (being), nor a function of unifi-
cation (relative nothingness). Since it is not a possibility of thinking, it 
is the end of consciousness. (See nkz 4: 232)
 Empty. Absolute nothingness is empty like a mirror that reflects every-
thing within itself by virtue of having no characteristics of its own. It 
is not a being (Seiend), but neither is it a completely undifferentiated 
(hidden) being standing in opposition to differentiated being.
 All-encompassing. Absolute nothingness is the most inclusive of all 
basho. This aspect is its “locational” (場所的) character. It is absolute 
nothingness qua “place” (or universal). It includes everything. It 
grounds all activities, all dialectics, and all objects.
 Beyond opposition. As all-encompassing, absolute nothingness is beyond 
the opposition of being and nonbeing, of mobility and immobility. 
This is why it is called absolute (絶対), “not depending on opposition.” 
This is what enables it to situate and determine all opposites without 
becoming entangled in opposition itself (see nkz 4: 213).
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 Self-negating. Unless absolute nothingness is self-negating, it is only 
one kind of being. Self-negation is the principal activity of absolute 
nothingness, that which makes all its other characteristics possible. 
Its emptiness and all-encompassing nature depend on self-negation 
understood as a reflexive act. As self-negation, it does not negate things 
themselves insofar as they are objects for consciousness. Here the uni-
versal disappears (nkz 4: 207), which leads us to the final two traits.
 Active. Absolute nothingness is active, but only in the sense of a seeing 
without a seer. It reflects all things as they are, without affecting their 
individuality. It accepts everything without judgment. It allows things 
to appear as they really are and yet as shadows (or reflections) of a final 
basho. This activity is also referred to as “self-negation” within Nishi-
da’s system, but if this self-negation were “statically” empty and not a 
ceaselessly active self-negating, absolute nothingness would become a 
mere position of emptiness, that is, a mode of being.
 Reflexive. The activity of absolute nothingness is directed toward 
itself. It reflects itself as within a mirror, opening a horizon wider than 
consciousness. This character is its self-aware (自覚的) aspect: what is 
thought is also what thinks. In Nishida’s later terminology, the dialecti-
cal world thinks itself through human thinking.
Looking at the relationship between Buddhism and the logic of place 
from the merely formal point of view, then, it is possible to distinguish 
three classes of distinguishing traits: 
1.  notions presumably deriving from western philosophy (among 
which I count its all-encompassing quality, which is not a Bud-
dhist problem in the metaphysical conceptual sense). 
2.  images originating in Buddhism (for example the image of 
void, or mirror. These images cannot be found, at least with 
the same meaning, in western philosophy). 
3.  ambiguous notions, that may be traced to both western phi-
losophy and to Buddhism, which can affect one’s overall read-
ing of Nishida’s thought, and whose interpretation depends on 
the shared cultural background of the reader and the writer as 
much as on the immediate context of his arguments. 
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The ambiguous notions, it should be noted, shift meanings “obliquely.”10 
That is to say, the change is not clearly formalized but takes place in the 
unfolding of the text. Among them, we may certainly count the idea 
of negation, whose importance to all the traits of absolute nothingness 
considered above needs clear philosophical expression.
Oppositional vs. reflexive negation
Negation, it goes without saying, is a cardinal theme in nearly 
all of western philosophy, not just in Hegelian thought. Nishida, how-
ever, takes it in a rather different direction. To understand his strategy we 
need to distinguish between two possible kinds of negation. The first is 
what we may call oppositional negation in which one of the opposites is 
held to be false and the other true. This negation lies at the foundations 
of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction, as an essential tool for 
the preservation of identity and its distinction from other identities. This 
also holds true for Hegel’s system, even though identity is subjected to 
a process of self-realization. From this perspective, determination, which 
makes something what it is (a=a) and not something else, is at the same 
time the negation of its identity with anything else. Therefore, each 
thing must have its own determination, or a limited number of determi-
nations, as is the case in Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction. Oppo-
sition is based on a determinate self-identity, whose positing requires 
a contrast with other determinations. This is clearly stated in Spinoza’s 
famous phrase, Omnis determinatio est negatio, indicating that any single 
determination, in order to be itself, must be different from other deter-
minations.
In discussions of opposing relatives, the negation of the identity of dif-
ferent determinations does not necessarily negate the other determina-
tions as such, but only the judgment of their identity. The problem arises 
when we apply this kind of opposition to a fundamental universal such 
as with reason or being, where the claim to absoluteness excludes other 
10. I am referring here to Jullien’s idea of oblique strategies of meaning in China 
(1995).
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determinations from reality itself. In these cases, the negation of identity 
is no longer a simple affirmation of difference anymore; it is a denial of 
the very possibility of differentiation.
Nishida argues that such an idea of identity, with its correlative nega-
tion, obstructs the universality of the universal. If the most fundamental 
universal were determined, in other words, if it were a position, it would 
have to align itself with one side of the oppositions. This would force 
things into an artificial scheme and exclude their individuality. Hence, a 
different kind of negation is required. We may call it a non-oppositional 
or reflexive negation. 
This type of negation does not negate individuals or determinations. 
On the contrary, it negates itself on the grounds that the particular, 
determined nature of negation is a hindrance to experiencing true reality. 
Nishida sees opposition and its accompanying determinations as depend-
ing on notions of substance and category. But theoretical discourse, in 
order to be truly all-encompassing and to subsume the true self, must 
have no determinations—not even the determination of “not having 
determinations.” It cannot negate any particular determination, because 
negating something means taking a determined position, which would 
imply a partial standpoint. On the contrary, absolute negation must 
transcend oppositions. Thanks to its non-oppositional and non-substan-
tial character, absolute negation guarantees access to the immediacy of 
things. It is not self-assertive (a=a), but all-encompassing.11 Thus, the 
rational subject opens itself up to the realization that it is embraced by a 
wider horizon beyond the struggle of opposites. In this sense, Nishida’s 
philosophy is an attempt to set critical, oppositional negation within a 
wider, active horizon of non-oppositional, ontological difference that is 
not negated from the outside by reason but negates itself from within.
Nishida’s logic of place merges the quest for ontological totality (a 
derivative of western idealism) with a general orientation to self-detach-
ment, which may be interpreted as deriving from his association with 
11. This conception of comprehensive, non-self-assertive identity may be compared 
to Kasulis’s “intimacy-integrity” paradigm, where the relationship between thinking 
and the world is obtained not from a position of mutual opposition but from a mutual 
internal relation (Kasulis 2002).
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Buddhist culture. More than a definite concept, self-negation is an alter-
native approach to a static and substantial understanding of identity, sub-
jectivity, and being, in that it uncovers their dynamic relationship with 
absolute nothingness. Absolute nothingness itself must be self-negat-
ing if it is to avoid becoming just one more philosophical principle. In 
Nishida’s case, it is plausible to interpret this as a Buddhist insight, but 
more often than not it is reduced to a logical-ontological strategy, to the 
neglect of its directly ethical implications. In so doing, absolute nothing-
ness tends to be shunted into a framework of philosophical problems 
that bear no formal relation to Buddhism. 
I would venture to argue that the kind of self-negation described 
above is the distinguishing mark that sets Nishida’s ontology apart from 
other philosophies. Far from being an incidental quality, it goes to the 
very heart of his theory. Indeed, the threefold structure of basho high-
lights the two different levels of nothingness, relative and absolute, and 
emphasizes that everything, be it object or category, is ultimately relative 
and cannot lay claim to the status of a supreme horizon. Only absolute 
nothingness, absolutely negating itself, encompasses oppositions. If nothing-
ness is the most inclusive universal, it must be self-effacing; only a self-
negation of its identity can let things appear in their suchness. For this 
reason, when Nishida stresses the inner self-exhaustion of the concept 
of identity within metaphysics, he is in effect introducing a general Bud-
dhist idea of śūnyatā into his philosophical system.
This does not necessarily imply the impossibility of constructing a 
quite different kind of metaphysics from his operating premises. Is 
absolute nothingness a philosophical principle? Yes and no. Insofar as it 
results from a metaphysical approach to reality, it functions as a principle 
in questions dealing with “universals” and “general logic.” The logic of 
place exhibits the obvious influence of the Romantic ideas of the abso-
lute, in particular the Hegelian concept of an absolute totality. At the 
same time, insofar as Nishida’s absolute takes the onto-theological dis-
course of universals and totality to its limits, he is able both to move 
beyond a metaphysics of substance and to disengage the mechanism of 
self-negation from subjectivism. This then serves as the core of his idea of 
absolute nothingness. In this sense, absolute nothingness may be consid-
ered a modern philosophical variation on the Buddhist motif of śūnyatā.
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As I indicated earlier, Tanabe criticized Nishida’s basho of absolute 
nothingness as a substitution of the metaphysical principle of being with 
a metaphysical principle of nothingness. For Tanabe, everything in exis-
tence is mediated and dialectically affirmed, whereas Nishida’s absolute 
nothingness is an unmediated and immediate ground of the world (thz 
6: 467–9). Tanabe accuses Nishida’s basho of absorbing human finite-
ness into the absolute (see Takehana 2006). He grants that absolute 
nothingness determines itself in finite beings (“that which is located,” 於
いてあるもの), but argues that seeing this self-determination as direct and 
unmediated collapses into the “mysticism” of an unmediated relation-
ship with the absolute. Moreover, he agrees with Nishida’s idea of abso-
lute nothingness as being-and yet-nothingness (有即無), movement-and 
yet-stillness (動即静), but disagrees with his position of a “non-dialectical 
affirmation of dialectics” (thz 6:473) and the consequent rendering of 
absolute nothingness as a direct object of intuition (直観). All of that 
would introduce the relativity of being into nothingness, which can 
never be an object of thought but only a reality of life (see e.g. thz, 4: 
305–28). In defining the world of being as relative and mediated, Tanabe 
cannot but criticize those elements in Nishida’s absolute nothingness as 
reducing the notion to a kind of relative being. 
These criticisms need to be rethought in the light of Nishida’s under-
standing of self-negation, but they also lead us to consider the role of 
Buddhism in the objections of Tanabe, whose emphasis on the dialectical 
character of absolute nothingness and strong stance against substantialist 
thinking both color his distaste for Nishida’s idea of “place” and its con-
notations of a “position.” Leaving aside the details of their disagreement, 
I would only note that fuller attention to the self-negating activity of 
absolute nothingness in Nishida may help to show how their positions 
converge more than either of them may have realized.
A buddhist interpretation of nishida’s negation
Nishida’s closest approximation to Buddhism, I believe, is to 
be found in his idea of reflexive negation, according to which absolute 
nothingness is the final outcome of an epistemological ethics of self-nega-
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tion. In other words, only a self-emptying absolute is truly able to accept 
reality in its entirety and without discrimination. The similarities of this 
ethic to Buddhism, though striking, are limited to ontological questions 
flowing into the search for the universal. Precisely as non-metaphysical 
response to a set of metaphysical problems, his idea of absolute nothing-
ness is inherently ambiguous, like a non-metaphysical finger pointing to 
a metaphysical moon.
Can we really speak of absolute nothingness as a practical attitude? 
Nishida’s concept of place would seem to argue against this. To be sure, 
absolute nothingness is involved in unending self-negation in its open-
ing to true reality. Still, from the Buddhist point of view, its attachment 
to the language of universals gives it the appearance of a mere meta-
physical shadow of emptiness. In this sense, Tanabe’s criticism may be 
partially correct, though not in the sense that Nishida created a different 
mode of being, but rather in the sense that it did not open up to practice 
or action. It is not insignificant that Tanabe’s own philosophy took this 
direction in his notions of “absolute mediation” and “metanoetics,” and 
that Nishida himself later came to focus on the dialectical world. The 
transition from the logic of place to a logic of contradictory self-identity, 
despite the obvious continuity between the two, was profoundly affected 
by Tanabe’s objections.
There is little doubt that reflexive negation converges with Buddhist 
emptiness insofar as it entails the self-emptying of emptiness. This would 
imply that even nothingness can turn into being to the extent that it is 
not radically self-negating. In Buddhism everything (Buddhist doctrines 
included) can become a source of attachment and defilement. For this 
reason, I would argue that it is more fruitful to compare śūnyatā with 
the activity of self-negation and self-determination, two ideas that per-
meate the whole of Nishida’s philosophy. What makes absolute nothing-
ness absolute is the inner mechanism of reflexive negation that allows 
“things as they are” to appear without the interfering pressures of mind. 
Nevertheless, as a “universal,” vestiges of metaphysics still cling to the 
notion. 
If this ambiguity between Buddhist and Hegelian elements, so to 
speak, is seen at a conceptual level—that is, if absolute nothingness is 
a concept of nothingness that gives rise to all things through its self-
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negation—the Buddhist orientation is seriously compromised by the 
presence of a metaphysical principle. If, however, one reads the notion 
in terms of an active stance toward oneself and the world, the Buddhist 
aspect comes into clearer relief. In other words, absolute nothingness is 
Buddhist insofar as it is engaged in self-negation; and it is not Buddhist 
insofar as it is conceived realistically as a negative universal that lies at the 
immediate foundation of the world. Buddhist emptiness does not have 
to do only with awakening to the transiency of things and the self, but 
also with the emptiness of dualistic thinking itself.12 Vacillating between 
ontology and non-foundationalism, Nishida shows his clearest affinity to 
Buddhism in his notion of self-negation, which lies closer to the core of 
his idea of absolute nothingness than its metaphysical overtones.
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